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OVERLAND THRIFT AND LOAN, a
Utah corporation; LINDA D.
MILNE, and WESTERN SURETY
COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellees.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Appeal from final summary judgments of the
Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah
Salt Lake County, Honorable Scott Daniesl, Presiding
Michael L. Dowdle
ALLEN NELSON HARDY & EVANS
215 South State Street
Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone 801 531 8400
Attorney for Appellee
Overland

Dale L. Larson, Pro Se
Grethe Larseon, Pro Se
4845 South 3600 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118
Telephone 801 268 5570

Joseph T. Dunbeck
WATKISS AND SAPERSTEIN
310 South Main Street
Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone 801 363 3300
Attorney for Appellees
Milne and Western

NOV

4199V
r Noonan

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DALE L. LARSON, GRETHE
LARSON, and SYSTEMATIC
BUILDERS, INC., a Utah
corporation,
PLaintiffs-Appellants,
No. 900411-CA

V.
OVERLAND THRIFT AND LOAN, a
Utah corporation; LINDA D.
MILNE, and WESTERN SURETY
COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellees.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Appeal from final summary judgments of the
Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah
Salt Lake County, Honorable Scott Daniesl, Presiding
Michael L. Dowdle
ALLEN NELSON HARDY & EVANS
215 South State Street
Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone 801 531 8400
Attorney for Appellee
Overland
Joseph T. Dunbeck
WATKISS AND SAPERSTEIN
310 South Main Street
Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone 801 363 3300
Attorney for Appellees
Milne and Western

Dale L. Larson, Pro Se
Grethe Larseon, Pro Se
4845 South 3600 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118
Telephone 801 268 5570

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION

1

CONCLUSION

6

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Colonial Leasing v. Larsen, 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986)

5

Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988)

2

Holland v. Wilson, 8 Ut2d 11, 327 P.2d 150 (1956)

2

Young Elec. Sign v. United Standard West, 755 P.2d
162 (Utah 1988)

2

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Rule 56(c)
Utah Code Anno: §57-1-32 (1985)

4

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DALE L. LARSON; GRETHE LARSON;
and SYSTEMATIC BUILDERS, INC*,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Case No. 900411-CA

v.
OVERLAND THRIFT AND LOAN; LINDA
D. MILNE; and WESTERN SURETY
COMPANY,
Defendants and Appelleees.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Appellants herein herewith make and file their
petition for rehearing pursuant to Rule 35, Utah R. App. P.,
and following state with particularity the points of law
and fact the court has overlooked or misapprehended in its
opinion filed October 17, 1991.
INTRODUCTION
The present controversy involves the efforts of
defendant Overland to recover allowable damages for breach of
an equipment lease.

According to the agreement of the parties,

payments required to be made under the lease agreement were
secured not only by the equipment described in the lease but
also purportedly by the residence of plaintiffs Larson through
a trust deed irregularly executed by Grethe Larson who affixed
her own signature to the trust deed as well as that of her
husband Dale.
Because Overland commenced its recovery efforts by

non-judicial foreclosure procedures against the trust deed the
parties are reversed from that usually encountered because it
became necessary for plaintiffs to institute this action to
have their rights and liabilities under the lease agreement and
trust deed declared and determined, and if fraud be found, for
rescission and damages.

As the Court's decision recites, Overland i

an assignee of the lease agreement and beneficiary in the trust deec
Plaintiffs properly demanded trial by jury of all issues.
(Because the issues here involved the determination of the right
to the possession of plaintiffs1 residence they were entitled to
jury trial on all issues of fact relating thereto.
Wilson, 8 Ut2d

Holland v.

11, 327 P.2d 150 (1958); Hansen v. Stewart, Utah

Supreme Court Opinion filed July 28, 1988 #19383.)
Overland1s right to recovery is limited by the provisions of the lease agreement that allow for the recovery of
damages upon default of the lessee(s).

If the lease agreement

provides for liquidated damages, which is the case here, and
the amount of liquidated damages is disproportionate to the
possible compensatory damages (full contract [lease] price, less
the current value of the equipment, and the time value of the
payments), and constitutes a forfeiture or penalty, then defendant Overland may not recover.

Young Elec. Sign v. United

Standard West, 755 P.2d 162 (Utah 1988).
Plaintiffs claim fraud in the inducement on the part
of agents of Overland"s assignor and consequently Overland.
It is plaintiffs claim that defendant Milne as agent and employee
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participated in the fraud by falsely notarizing the trust deed
and seeing to its recordation.
As the Court recites in its decision, Overland purchased
Larsons1 residence for $51,864.90 at non-judicial foreclosure
sale with full knowledge that Larsons were claiming the underlying trust deed was obtained through fraud and was otherwise
irregular (forged by one of the purported signers).

Overland

thereafter did nothing to undo the sale or to adjust its
position relative to the plaintiffs1 claims.

In fact, Overland

sought and was granted summary judgment that "the execution of
a Deed of Trust [the deed of trust] by Grethe Larson describing
the Residence was valid, binding, and enforceable as a matter
of law, and that it further created a severance of the joint
tenancy of Dale L. Larson and Grethe Larson in the Residence.
Pursuant to such transfer of interest by Grethe Larson and the
subsequent foreclosure of the Deed of Trust by Overland, the
Court orders that the present interests of Overland and Dale
L. Larson in and to the Residence are that of tenants in common,
each owning an individual one-half (1/2) interest therein; . . .'
thereby confirming purchase by Overland for $51,864.90 at foreclosure sale.

This would seem to conflict with the Court's

analysis of the facts that ". . .the real property was sold to
Overland

for $51,864.90" and "the [district] court . . .

ordered the transfer of Grethe Larson's one-half interest in
the Larsons' home to Overland."
Although without a legal determination of whether
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due or not, under anyone's interpretation of the record,
Larsons are entitled to have $51,864.90 credited against
any obligations under the lease agreement purportedly owing
at the time of the sale.

Using Overland's summary judgment

proof (Affidavit of K. Douglas Anderson, r. 961-65) as a
guide as to the amount owing on May 27, 1987 under the rule
of damages (benefit of the bargain) stated above, there would
be nothing due Overland on the lease after the application of
$51,864.90.

Overland having purchased and paid $51,876.90 for

the property securing the lease agreement there was no further
obligation thereunder for plaintiffs, or either of them, to pay
anything.

Overland, having elected to proceed as it did (non-

judicial foreclosure) is bound by the results; and in that it
sought no deficiency in the manner prescribed by statute (§57-1-32)
cannot subvert the intent of that procedure by proceeding on a
cause of action under the lease and guaranty agreement against
plaintiff Dale Larson that does not exist.

It is this theory of

double recovery that plaintiffs espoused throughout these proceedings in the trial and appellate courts, and not, as the
Court suggests "enforcement of the lease allowed double recovery
and penalty because Overland only sought to recover amounts due
after offset from sale proceeds."
All of the foregoing facts and inferences were properly
before the trial court at the time of the summary judgments; each
presents the issue of whether Overland (and Milne and her surety)
were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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The rule in Colonial Leasing [731 P.2d 483] applies
here.

Where certain lease provisions, e.g., those quoted

in fn. 2 of the Court's decision, are the same or similar to
provisions normally contained in security or sale agreements,
an ambiguity is created concerning the intentions of the
parties that can only be cleared up by extrinsic evidence
which has been denied by the Court's decision in this case.
In summary judgment proceedings it is for the proponent to
establish the non-existence of factual issues, and that he
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

In this record

whether the lease agreement is a true lease or a security
agreement remains a question because ambiguities exist as
to the intentions of the parties that can only be resolved
by a jury.
In its decision the Court holds that because of procedureal default appellants will not be permitted to
challenge in this appeal the award of attorney's fees in
the judgment against defendant Dale Larson.

The sanction

serves purely a technical interest; and again it is the
case that in challenges to summary judgments it is for the
proponent to establish that such judgment would be proper
because no questions of material fact remain and movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The record itself,

devoid of showing of legal justification and professional
reasonableness for the fee award, leaves questions of fact
remaining as to the legal justification and professional
reasonableness for the fee award.
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In its decision the Court did not address the penalty
or forefeiture issue as it is presented by appellants.

Againf

it was Overland1s duty in its summary judgment motion to establish
that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

In the

trial and appellate courts appellants have contended that Overland
did not establish its right to judgment under the liquidated
damages provision of the lease agreement because it would result
in a penalty or forfeiture.

A penalty results for two reasons;

first, in determining the amount of recovery there is no credit
given the lessee for the current market value of the leased
equipment; and, second, the lessor is allowed "a sum equal to
one-third of the monthly payments that would have been paid if
the lease had continued in full force and effect for [60 months],
without consideration of the shortening of the term by reason of
default."

The provision is therefore unenforceable as a penalty,

Young Elec. Sign, supra,

because the amount of liquidated

damages agreed to is disproportionate to the possible compensatory
damages.
CONCLUSION
At the entry of summary judgments herein,
1.

A question of material fact remained as to whether,

or to what extent, the obligations under the lease agreement had
been discharged at the time of Overland1s counterclaim.
2.

A question of material fact remained as to what

obligations $51,864.90 paid.
3.

A question of material fact remained as to whether

the lease agreement was a true lease or a sale agreement.
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4.

A question of material fact remained as to

whether there was a commercially reasonable disposition
of the leased equipment after default and repossession.
5.

Overland had not established its right to judgment

as a matter of law under the liquidated damages provision,
6.

A question of material fact remains as to whether

plaintiff was damaged by the fraudulent actions of the notary
public.
WHEREFORE, appellants cerify that this petition is
presented in good faith and not for delay, and pray that the
same be in all things granted.
DATED November 4, 1991.
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